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ABSTRACT
Recent evidence suggests that consumption rises in response to an increase in government spending.
That finding cannot be easily reconciled with existing optimizing business cycle models. We extend
the standard new Keynesian model to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. We show
how the interaction of the latter with sticky prices and deficit financing can account for the existing
evidence on the effects of government spending.
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What are the eﬀects of changes in government purchases on aggregate economic ac-
tivity? How are those eﬀects transmitted? Even though such questions are central
to macroeconomics and its ability to inform economic policy, there is no widespread
agreement on their answer. In particular, though most macroeconomic models pre-
dict that a rise in government purchases will have an expansionary eﬀect on output,
those models often diﬀer regarding the implied eﬀects on consumption. Since the
latter variable is the largest component of aggregate demand, its response is a key
determinant of the size of the government spending multiplier.
The standard RBC and the textbook IS-LM models provide a stark example of
such diﬀerential qualitative predictions. The standard RBC model generally predicts
a decline in consumption in response to a rise in government purchases of goods
and services (henceforth, government spending, for short). In contrast, the IS-LM
model predicts that consumption should rise, hence amplifying the eﬀects of the
expansion in government spending on output. Of course, the reason for the diﬀerential
impact across those two models lies in how consumers are assumed to behave in
each case. The RBC model features in￿nitely-lived Ricardian households, whose
consumption decisions at any point in time are based on an intertemporal budget
constraint. Ceteris paribus, an increase in government spending lowers the present
value of after-tax income, thus generating a negative wealth eﬀect that induces a
cut in consumption.1 By way of contrast, in the IS-LM model consumers behave in
a non-Ricardian fashion, with their consumption being a function of their current
disposable income and not of their lifetime resources. Accordingly, the implied eﬀect
1The mechanisms underlying those eﬀects are described in detail in Aiyagari et al. (1990), Baxter
and King (1993), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and FatÆs and Mihov (2001), among others.
In a nutshell, an increase in (non-productive) government purchases, ￿nanced by current or future
lump-sum taxes, has a negative wealth eﬀect which is re￿ected in lower consumption. It also induces
a rise in the quantity of labor supplied at any given wage. The latter eﬀect leads, in equilibrium,
to a lower real wage, higher employment and higher output. The increase in employment leads, if
suﬃciently persistent, to a rise in the expected return to capital, and may trigger a rise in investment.
In the latter case the size of the multiplier is greater or less than one, depending on parameter values.
1of an increase in government spending will depend critically on how the latter is
￿nanced, with the multiplier increasing with the extent of de￿cit ￿nancing.2
What does the existing empirical evidence have to say regarding the consumption
eﬀects of changes in government spending? Can it help discriminate between the
two paradigms mentioned above, on the grounds of the observed response of con-
sumption? A number of recent empirical papers shed some light on those questions.
They all apply multivariate time series methods in order to estimate the responses
of consumption and a number of other variables to an exogenous increase in govern-
ment spending. They diﬀer, however, on the assumptions made in order to identify
the exogenous component of that variable. In Section 2 we describe in some detail
the ￿ndings from that literature that are most relevant to our purposes, and provide
some additional empirical results of our own. In particular, and like several other
authors that preceded us, we ￿nd that a positive government spending shock leads
to a signi￿cant increase in consumption, while investment either falls or does not
respond signi￿cantly. Thus, our evidence seems to be consistent with the predictions
of models with non-Ricardian consumers, and hard to reconcile with those of the
neoclassical paradigm.
After reviewing the evidence, we turn to our paper￿s main contribution: the devel-
opment of a simple dynamic general equilibrium model that can potentially account
for that evidence. Our framework shares many ingredients with recent dynamic opti-
mizing sticky price models, though we modify the latter by allowing for the presence
of rule-of-thumb behavior by some households.3 Following Campbell and Mankiw
2See, e.g., Blanchard (2001). The total eﬀect on output will also depend on the investment
response. Under the assumption of a constant money supply, generally maintained in textbook
versions of that model, the rise in consumption is accompanied by an investment decline (resulting
from a higher interest rate). If instead the central bank holds the interest rate steady in the face
of the increase in government spending, the implied eﬀect on investment is nil. However, any
￿intermediate￿ response of the central bank (i.e., one that does not imply full accommodation of
the higher money demand induced by the rise in output) will also induce a fall in investment in the
IS-LM model.
3See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), or Woodford
(2003) for a description of the standard new Keynesian model.
2(1989), we assume that rule-of-thumb consumers do not borrow or save; instead,
they are assumed to consume their current income fully. In our model, rule-of-thumb
consumers coexist with conventional in￿nite-horizon Ricardian consumers.
The introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers in our model is motivated by an
extensive empirical literature pointing to substantial deviations from the permanent
income hypothesis. Much of that literature provides evidence of ￿excessive￿ depen-
dence of consumption on current income. That evidence is based on the analysis
of aggregate time series4, as well as natural experiments using micro data (e.g. re-
sponse to anticipated tax refunds).5 That evidence also seems consistent with the
observation that a signi￿cant fraction of households have near-zero net worth.6 On
the basis of that evidence, Mankiw (2000) calls for the systematic incorporation of
non-Ricardian households in macroeconomic models, and for an examination of the
policy implications of their presence.
As further explained below, the existence of non-Ricardian households cannot in
itself generate a positive response of consumption to a rise in government spending.
To see this, consider the following equilibrium condition
mpnt = ￿t + ct + ϕnt
where mpnt, ct,a n dnt represent the (logs) of the marginal product of labor, con-
sumption, and hours worked, respectively. The term ct + ϕnt represents the (log)
marginal rate of substitution, with parameter ϕ > 0 measuring the curvature of the
marginal disutility of labor. Variable ￿t is thus the wedge between the marginal rate
of substitution and the marginal product of labor, and can be interpreted as the
sum of both the (log) wage and price markups, as discussed in Gal￿, Gertler, and
L￿pez-Salido (2005).
Consider ￿r s ta ne c o n o m yw i t hac o n s t a n tw e d g e ,￿t = ￿ for all t.N o t i c e t h a t
4See, e.g. Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Deaton (1992) and references therein.
5See, e.g., Souleles (1999), and Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2004).
6See, e.g., Wolﬀ (1998)
3the particular case of ￿ =0corresponds to the perfectly competitive case often as-
sumed in the RBC literature. According to both theory and evidence, an increase
in government purchases raises hours and, under standard assumptions, lowers the
marginal product of labor. Thus, it follows that consumption must drop if the pre-
vious condition is to be satis￿ed. Hence, a necessary condition for consumption to
rise in response to a ￿scal expansion is the existence of a simultaneous decline in
the wedge ￿t. This motivates the introduction in our framework of the assumption
of sticky prices in goods markets (and, at least in one version of our model, of im-
perfectly competitive labor markets), complementing the presence of non-Ricardian
consumers. As described below, our model predicts responses of aggregate consump-
tion and other variables that are in line with the existing evidence, given plausible
calibrations of the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers, the degree of price stickiness,
and the extent of de￿cit ￿nancing, .
Beyond the narrower focus of the present paper, a simple lesson emerges from our
analysis: allowing for deviations from the strict Ricardian behavior assumed in the
majority of existing macro models may be required in order to capture important
aspects of the economy￿s workings.7 Our proposed framework, based on the simple
model of rule-of-thumb consumers of Campbell and Mankiw (1989), while admittedly
ad-hoc, provides in our view a good starting point.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the existing
empirical literature and provides some new evidence. Section 3 lays out the model
and its diﬀerent blocks. Section 4 contains an analysis of the model￿s equilibrium
dynamics. Section 5 examines the equilibrium response to a government spending
shock under alternative calibrations, focusing on the response of consumption and its
consistency with the existing evidence. Section 6 summarizes the main ￿ndings of
the paper and points to potential extensions and directions for further research.
7In a companion paper (Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2005)), we study the implications of
rule-of-thumb consumers for the stability properties of Taylor-type rules.
42 An Overview of the Evidence
In the present section we start by summarizing the existing evidence on the response
of consumption (and some other variables) to an exogenous increase in government
spending, and provide some new evidence of our own. Most of the existing evidence
relies on structural vector autoregressive models, with diﬀerent papers using alterna-
tive identi￿cation schemes. Unfortunately, the data does not seem to speak with a
single voice on this issue: while some papers uncover a large, positive and signi￿cant
response of consumption, others ￿nd that such a response is small and often insignif-
icant. As far as we know, however, there is no evidence in the literature pointing
to the large and signi￿cant negative consumption response that would be consistent
with the predictions of the neoclassical model.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and FatÆs and Mihov (2001) identify exogenous
shocks to government spending by assuming that the latter variable is predetermined
relative to the other variables included in the VAR. Their most relevant ￿ndings for
our purposes can be summarized as follows. First, a positive shock to government
spending leads to a persistent rise in that variable. Second, the implied ￿scal ex-
pansion generates a positive response in output, with the associated multiplier being
greater than one in FatÆs and Mihov (2001), but close to one in Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002). Third, in both papers the ￿scal expansion leads to large (and signi￿cant)
increases in consumption. Fourth, the response of investment to the spending shock
is found to be insigni￿cant in FatÆs and Mihov (2001), but negative (and signi￿cant)
in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Here we provide some complementary evidence using an identi￿cation strategy
similar to the above mentioned papers. Using U.S. quarterly data, we estimate the
responses of several macroeconomic variables to a government spending shock. The
latter is identi￿ed by assuming that government purchases are not aﬀected contempo-
raneously (i.e. within the quarter) by the innovations in the other variables contained
5in a VAR.8 Our VAR includes a measure of government spending, GDP, hours worked,
consumption of nondurables and services, private nonresidential investment, the real
wage, the budget de￿cit, and personal disposable income. In a way consistent with
the model developed below, both government spending and the budget de￿cit enter
the VAR as a ratio to trend GDP, where the latter is proxied by (lagged) potential
output. The remaining variables are speci￿ed in logs, following convention.9.
Figure 1 displays the estimated impulse responses. Total government spending
rises signi￿cantly and persistently, with a half-life of about four years. Output rises
persistently in response to that shock, as predicted by the theory. Most interestingly,
however, consumption is also shown to rise on impact and to remain persistently above
zero. A similar pattern is displayed by disposable income; in fact, as shown in the
bottom right graph, the response of consumption tracks, almost one-for-one, that of
disposable income. With respect to the labor variables, our point estimates imply that
both hours and the real wage rise persistently in response to the ￿scal shock, although
with some delay relative to government spending itself.10 By contrast investment falls
slightly in the short run, though the response is not signi￿cant. Finally, the de￿cit
8Qualitatively, the results below are robust to the use of military spending (instead of total
government purchases) as a predetermined variable in the VAR, as in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992).
9We use quarterly U.S. data over the period 1954:I-2003:IV. The series were drawn from Estima￿s
USECON database (mnemonics reported in brackets below). These include government (Federal
+ State + Local) consumption and gross investment expenditures (GH), gross domestic product
(GDPH), a measure of aggregate hours obtained by multiplying total civilian employment (LE)
by weekly average hours in manufacturing (LRMANUA), nonfarm business hours (LXNFH), the
real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector (LXNFR), consumption of nondurable
and services (CNH+CSH), non-residential investment (FNH), and the CBO estimate of potential
GDP (GDPPOTHQ). All quantity variables are in log levels, and normalized by the size of the
civilian population over 16 years old (LNN). We included four lags of each variable in the VAR.
Our de￿cit measure corresponds to gross government investment (GFDI+GFNI+GSI) minus gross
government savings (obtained from the FRED-II database). The resulting variable, expressed in
nominal terms was normalized by the lagged trend nominal GDP (GDPPOTQ). Finally, disposable
income corresponds to real personal disposable income, also drawn from the FRED-II.
10Fatas and Mihov (2001) also uncover a signi￿cant rise in the real wage in response to a spending
shock, using compensation per hour in the non-farm business sector as a measure of the real wage.
The positive comovement between hours and the real wage in response to a shock in military spending
was originally emphasized by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). See also Rotemberg and Woodford
(1995).
6rises signi￿cantly on impact, remaining positive for about two years.
Our point estimates in Figure 1 imply a government spending multiplier on out-
put,
dYt+k
dGt ,o f0.78 on impact (k =0 ) , and of 1.74 at the end of the second year
(k =8 ). Such estimated multipliers are of a magnitude similar to the ones reported
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They are also roughly consistent with the range of
estimated short-run expenditure multipliers generated by a variety of macroeconomet-
ric models.11 Most importantly for our purposes is the observation that the multiplier
on consumption is always positive, going from 0.17 on impact to 0.95 at the end of
the second year.
Table 1 illustrates the robustness of these ￿ndings to alternative speci￿cations of
the VAR, including number of variables (four vs. eight variable), sample period (full
postwar, post Korean war, and post-1960), and de￿nition of government spending
(excluding and including military spending).12 The left panel of the table reports the
size of the multipliers on output and consumption at diﬀerent horizons (on impact,
one-year, and two-year horizons, respectively).13 While the exact size of the estimated
multipliers varies somewhat across speci￿cations, the central ￿nding of a positive
response of consumption holds for the vast majority of cases.14
As mentioned above, some papers in the literature call into question (or at least
qualify) the previous evidence. Perotti (2004) applies the methodology of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) to several OECD countries. He emphasizes the evidence of sub-
sample instability in the eﬀects of government spending shocks, with the responses
in the 80s and 90s being more muted than in the earlier period. Nevertheless, the
sign and magnitude of the response of private consumption in Perotti￿s estimates
largely mimics that of GDP, both across countries and across sample periods. Hence,
11See Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) and the survey of the evidence provided in IMF (2004,
chapter 2).
12See Table 1 for details.
13The right panel is used below for the purposes of model calibration.
14The only exception corresponds to the small VAR speci￿cation over the full sample period and
excluding military spending. Yet, the underlying impulse responses (not shown) indicate that the
slightly negative impact eﬀect on consumption is quickly reversed in that case.
7his ￿ndings support a positive comovement between consumption and income, condi-
tional on government spending shocks, in a way consistent with the model developed
below (though at odds with the neoclassical model).15
Mountford and Uhlig (2004) apply the agnostic identi￿cation procedure originally
proposed in Uhlig (1997) to identify and estimate the eﬀects of a ￿balanced bud-
get￿ and a ￿de￿cit spending￿ shock.16 They ￿nd that government spending shocks
crowd out both residential and non-residential investment, but they hardly change
consumption (the response of the latter is small and insigni￿cant).
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a narrative approach to identify shocks that raise
military spending, and which they codify by means of a dummy variable (widely
known as the "Ramey-Shapiro dummy"). They ￿nd that nondurable consumption
displays a slight, though hardly signi￿cant decline, while durables consumption falls
persistently, but only after a brief but quantitatively large rise on impact. They also
￿nd that the product wage decreases, even though the real wage remains pretty much
unchanged.17
Several other papers have used subsequently the identi￿cation scheme proposed
by Ramey and Shapiro in order to study the eﬀects of exogenous changes in govern-
ment spending on diﬀerent variables. Thus, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999)
show that a Ramey-Shapiro episode triggers a fall in real wages, an increase in non-
residential investment, and a mild and delayed fall in the consumption of nondurables
and services, though durables consumption increases on impact. More recent work
by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) using a similar approach reports a ￿at
response of aggregate consumption in the short run, followed by a small (and in-
signi￿cant) rise in that variable several quarters after the Ramey-Shapiro episode is
15The response of private investment to the same shock tends to be negative, especially in the
second sample period.
16This method is based on sign and near-zero restrictions on impulse responses.
17Ramey and Shapiro (1998) provide a potential explanation of the comovements of consumption
and real wages in response to a change in military spending, based on a two-sector model with costly
capital reallocation across sectors, and in which military expenditures are concentrated in one of the
two sectors (manufacturing).
8triggered.
Another branch of the literature, exempli￿ed by the work of Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990), has uncovered the presence of ￿non-Keynesian eﬀects￿ (i.e. negative spending
multipliers) during large ￿scal consolidations, with output rising signi￿cantly despite
large cuts in government spending. In particular, Perotti (1999) ￿nds evidence of a
negative comovement of consumption and government spending during such episodes
of ￿scal consolidation (and hence large spending cuts), but only in circumstances
of ￿￿scal stress￿ (de￿ned by unusually high debt/GDP ratios). In ￿normal￿ times,
however, the estimated eﬀects have the opposite sign, i.e. they imply a positive
response of consumption to a rise in government purchases. Nevertheless, as shown
in Alesina and Ardagna (1998), the evidence of non-Keynesian eﬀects during ￿scal
consolidations can hardly be interpreted as favorable to the neoclassical model since,
on average, cuts in government spending raise both output and consumption during
those episodes.18
Overall, we view the evidence discussed above as tending to favor the predictions of
the traditional Keynesian model over those of the neoclassical model. In particular,
none of the evidence appears to support the kind of strong negative comovement
between output and consumption predicted by the neoclassical model in response to
changes in government spending. Furthermore, in trying to understand some of the
empirical discrepancies discussed above it is worth emphasizing that the bulk of the
papers focusing on the response to changes in government spending in "ordinary"
times tend to support the traditional Keynesian hypothesis, in contrast with those
that focus on "extraordinary" ￿scal episodes (associated with wars or with large ￿scal
consolidations triggered by explosive debt dynamics).
In light of those considerations, we view the model developed below as an at-
tempt to account for the eﬀects of government spending shocks in ￿normal￿ times,
as opposed to extraordinary episodes. Accordingly, we explore the conditions under
18See Table 6 in Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
9which a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and rule-of-thumb
consumers can account for the positive comovement of consumption and government
purchases that arises in response to small exogenous variations in the latter variable.
3 A New Keynesian Model with Rule-of-Thumb
Consumers
The economy consists of two types of households, a continuum of ￿rms producing
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods, a perfectly competitive ￿rm producing a ￿nal good,
a central bank in charge of monetary policy, and a ￿scal authority. Next we describe
the objectives and constraints of the diﬀerent agents. Except for the presence of
rule-of-thumb consumers, our framework consists of a standard dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo.19
3.1 Households
We assume a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. A fraction
1 − λ of households have access to capital markets where they can trade a full set
of contingent securities, and buy and sell physical capital (which they accumulate
and rent out to ￿rms). We use the term optimizing or Ricardian to refer to that
subset of households. The remaining fraction λ of households do not own any assets
nor have any liabilities, and just consume their current labor income. We refer to
them as rule of thumb households. Diﬀerent interpretations for that behavior include
myopia, lack of access to capital markets, fear of saving, ignorance of intertemporal
trading opportunities, etc. Our assumptions imply an admittedly extreme form of
non-Ricardian behavior among rule of thumb households, but one that captures in
a simple and parsimonious way some of the existing evidence, without invoking a
19Most of the recent monetary models with nominal rigidities abstract from capital accumulation.
A list of exceptions includes King and Watson (1996), Yun (1996), Dotsey (1999), Kim (2000) and
Dupor (2002). In our framework, the existence of a mechanism to smooth consumption over time
is important in order for the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers to be
meaningful, thus justifying the need for introducing capital accumulation explicitly.
10speci￿c explanation. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) provide some aggregate evidence,
b a s e do ne s t i m a t e so fam o d i ￿ed Euler equation, of the quantitative importance of
such rule of thumb consumers in the U.S. and other industrialized economies.20
3.1.1 Optimizing Households
Let Co
t ,a n dLo
t represent consumption and leisure for optimizing households. Prefer-
ences are de￿ned by the discount factor β ∈ (0,1) and the period utility U(Co
t,L o
t).
































and the capital accumulation equation
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At the beginning of the period the consumer receives labor income WtPtNo
t ,w h e r e
Wt is the real wage, Pt is the price level, and No
t denotes hours of work. He also
receives income from renting his capital holdings Ko
t to ￿rms at the (real) rental cost
Rk
t. Bo
t is the quantity of nominally riskless one-period bonds carried over from period
t−1, and paying one unit of the numØraire in period t. Rt denotes the gross nominal
return on bonds purchased in period t. Do
t are dividends from ownership of ￿rms, T o
t
denote lump-sum taxes (or transfers, if negative) paid by these consumers. Co
t and Io
t
denote, respectively, consumption and investment expenditures, in real terms. Pt is









t, which determines the change in the capital stock induced by investment
spending Io
t .W ea s s u m eφ
0 > 0,a n dφ
00 ≤ 0,w i t hφ
0(δ)=1 ,a n dφ(δ)=δ.
20Mankiw (2000) reviews more recent microeconomic evidence consistent with that view.
11In what follows we specialize the period utility￿common to all households￿ to
take the form:
U(C,L) ≡ logC −
N1+ϕ
1+ϕ
where ϕ ≥ 0.
The ￿rst order conditions for the optimizing consumer￿s problem can be written
as:









































and where Qt is the (real) shadow value of capital in place, i.e., Tobin￿s Q.N o t i c e
that, under our assumption on φ, the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with
respect to Q is given by − 1
φ00(δ)δ ≡ η. 21
We consider two alternative labor market structures. First we assume a competi-
tive labor market, with each household choosing the quantity of hours supplied given
the market wage. In that case the optimality conditions above must be supplemented







Under our second labor market structure wages are set in a centralized manner
by an economy-wide union. In that case hours are assumed to be determined by
￿rms (instead of being chosen optimally by households), given the wage set by the
union. Households are willing to meet the demand from ￿rms, under the assumption
21See Basu and Kimball (2003) for a critical assessment of the predictions of new Keynesian models
with endogenous capital accumulation and a proposal for reconciling those predictions with some of
the evidence, based on the notion of costly investment planning.
12that wages always remain above all households￿ marginal rate of substitution. In
that case condition (8) no longer applies. We refer the reader to section 3.6 below
and Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the labor market under this alternative
assumption.
3.1.2 Rule-of-Thumb Households
Rule-of-thumb households are assumed to behave in a "hand-to-mouth" fashion, fully
consuming their current labor income. They do not smooth their consumption path
in the face of ￿uctuations in labor income, nor do they intertemporally substitute
in response to changes in interest rates. As noted above we do not take a stand on
the sources of that behavior, though one may possibly attribute it to a combination
of myopia, lack of access to ￿nancial markets, or (continuously) binding borrowing
constraints.






















Notice that we allow taxes paid by rule-of-thumb households (T r
t )t od i ﬀer from
those of the optimizing households (T o
t ). Under the assumption of a competitive labor







Alternatively, when the wage is set by a union, hours are determined by ￿rms￿
labor demand, and (8) does not apply. Again we refer the reader to the discussion
below.
133.1.3 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption and hours are given by a weighted average of the correspond-
ing variables for each consumer type. Formally:
Ct ≡ λ C
r




Nt = λ N
r
t +( 1− λ) N
o
t (14)
Similarly, aggregate investment and the capital stock are given by








We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms producing diﬀerenti-
ated intermediate goods. The latter are used as inputs by a (perfectly competitive)
￿rm producing a single ￿nal good.
3.2.1 Final Goods Firm










where Xt(j) is the quantity of intermediate good j used as an input and †p > 1.
Pro￿t maximization, taking as given the ￿nal goods price Pt and the prices for the












143.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firm
The production function for a typical intermediate goods ￿rm (say, the one producing




where Kt(j) and Nt(j) represent the capital and labor services hired by ￿rm j.22Cost





















where Ψ ≡ α−α(1 − α)−(1−α).
Price Setting Intermediate ￿rms are assumed to set nominal prices in a staggered
fashion, according to the stochastic time dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983).
Each ￿rm resets its price with probability 1−θ each period, independently of the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1 − θ of producers
reset their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged.








k Et {Λt,t+k Yt+k(j)( ( P
∗
t /Pt+k) − MCt+k)}








t represents the price chosen by ￿rms resetting prices at time t.




k Et {Λt,t+k Yt+k(j)( ( P
∗
t /Pt+k) − ￿
p MCt+k)} =0 (16)
22Without loss of generality we normalize total factor productivity to unity.
15where ￿p ≡
†p
†p−1 is the gross "frictionless" price markup, and the one prevailing in
az e r oi n ￿ation steady state. Finally, the equation describing the dynamics for the












In our baseline model the central bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate
rt ≡ Rt − 1 every period according to a simple linear interest rate rule:
rt = r + φπ πt (18)
where φπ ≥ 0 and r is the steady state nominal interest rate. An interest rate rule of
the form (18) is the simplest speci￿cation in which the conditions for indeterminacy
and their connection to the Taylor principle can be analyzed. Notice that it is a
particular case of the celebrated Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)), corresponding to a zero
coeﬃcient on the output gap, and a zero in￿ation target. Rule (18) is said to satisfy
the Taylor principle if and only if φπ > 1. A si sw e l lk n o w n ,i nt h ea b s e n c eo f
rule-of-thumb consumers, that condition is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee the
uniqueness of equilibrium.23
3.4 Fiscal Policy
The government budget constraint is
PtTt + R
−1
t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt (19)
where Tt ≡ λ Tr
t +(1−λ) T o
t . Letting gt ≡ Gt−G
Y , tt ≡ Tt−T
Y ,a n dbt ≡
(Bt/Pt−1)−(B/P)
Y ,
we henceforth assume a ￿scal policy rule of the form
tt = φb bt + φg gt (20)
23The ￿Taylor principle￿ refers to a property of interest rate rules for which an increase in in￿ation
eventually leads to a more than one-for-one rise in the nominal interest rate (see Woodford (2001)).
16where φb and φg are positive constants.
Finally, government purchases (in deviations from steady state, and normalized
by steady state output) are assumed to evolve exogenously according to a ￿rst order
autoregressive process:
gt = ρg gt−1 + εt (21)




The clearing of factor and good markets requires that the following conditions are









Yt(j)=Xt(j) for all j
and
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (22)
3.6 Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
In the present section we derive the log-linear versions of the key optimality and
market clearing conditions that will be used in our analysis of the model￿s equilibrium
dynamics. Some of these conditions hold exactly, while others represent ￿rst-order
approximations around a zero-in￿ation steady state. Henceforth, and unless otherwise
noted, lower case letters denote log-deviations with respect to the corresponding
steady state values (i.e., xt ≡ log Xt
X ).
173.6.1 Households
Next we list the log-linearized versions of the above households￿ optimality conditions,
expressed in terms of the aggregate variables. The log-linear equations describing the
dynamics of Tobin￿s Q and its relationship with investment are given respectively by
qt = β Et{qt+1} +[ 1− β(1 − δ)] Et{r
k
t+1} − (rt − Et{πt+1}) (23)
and
it − kt = η qt (24)
The log-linearized capital accumulation equation is:
kt+1 = δ it +( 1− δ) kt (25)





t+1} − (rt − Et{πt+1}) (26)
























As shown in the Appendix, the analysis is simpli￿ed by assuming that steady state
consumption is the same across household types, i.e. Cr = Co = C,a no u t c o m et h a t
can always be guaranteed by an appropriate choice of Tr and T o.S i n c et h ef o c u so f
our paper is on the diﬀerential responses to shocks, as opposed to steady state diﬀer-
ences across households, we view that assumption as being largely innocuous, while
simplifying the algebra considerably.24 In particular, under the above assumption,
24Notice that under perfectly competitive labor markets marginal rates of substitution are equal-
ized across households. The assumption of equal consumption levels in the steady state thus implies
that Nr = No = N as well. As discussed below, under our alternative labor market structure
equality of hours across household types holds independently of their relative level of consumption.
See Appendix 1 for details.
18the log-linearized expressions for aggregate consumption and hours take the following
simple form:
ct = λ c
r




nt = λ n
r
t +( 1− λ) n
o
t (29)
Under perfectly competitive labor markets, we can log-linearize expressions (8),
(12), and combine them with (28) and (29) to obtain:
wt = ct + ϕ nt (30)
Under the assumption of imperfectly competitive labor markets, one can also
interpret equation (30) as a log-linear approximation to a generalized wage schedule
of the form Wt = H(Ct,N t). In that case, and under the assumption that each ￿rm
decides how much labor to hire (given the wage), ￿rms will allocate labor demand
uniformly across households, independently of their type. Accordingly, we will have
Nr
t = No
t for all t.25 In Appendix 1 we show how a wage schedule of that form arises
in an economy in which wages are set by unions in order to maximize a weighted
average of the utility of both types of households.
Independently of the assumed labor market structure we can derive an intertem-
poral equilibrium condition for aggregate consumption of the form:
ct = Et{ct+1} − σ (rt − Et{πt+1}) − Θn Et{∆nt+1} + Θτ Et{∆t
r
t+1} (31)
In the case of perfectly competitive labor markets, the previous equation results
from combining (8), (12), (26), (27), (28) and (29), and the associated coeﬃcients are
25We implicitly assume that the resulting wage markup is suﬃciently high (and ￿uctuations




t for j = r,o are satis￿ed at all times.
Both conditions guarantee that both type of households will be willing to meet ￿rms￿ labor demand
at the prevaling wage. Notice also that consistency with balanced-growth requires that H can be
written as Ct h(Nt) (which happens to be consistent with (30)).
19given by:
σ ≡ (1 − λ)Γ [￿
pϕγc +( 1− α)]
Θn ≡ λ Γ(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)ϕ
Θt ≡ λ Γ￿
pϕ
where Γ ≡ 1
￿pϕγc+(1−α)(1−λ(1+ϕ)),a n dγc ≡ C
Y is the steady state consumption-output
ratio (which, does not depend on λ, as shown in Appendix 2 ). See Appendix 3 for
details of the derivation.
By contrast, under the assumption of an imperfectly competitive labor market,
(31) can be derived from combining (30), (26), (27), (28), (29), as well as the assump-
tion nr
t = no
t = nt . In that case the expressions for the coeﬃcients in (31)a r eg i v e n
by:
σ ≡ (1 − λ)Φγc￿
p
Θn ≡ λΦ(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)
Θt ≡ λΦ￿
p
where Φ ≡ 1
γc￿p−λ(1−α).
Notice that independently of the labor market structure assumed we have limλ→0
σ =1 , limλ→0 Θn =0 ,a n dlimλ→0 Θτ =0 , i.e., as the fraction of rule-of-thumb
consumers becomes negligible, the aggregate Euler equation approaches its standard
form given our utility speci￿cation.
Discussion A number of features of the above equilibrium conditions are worth
stressing. First, notice that the Euler equation (31) is the only log-linear equilibrium
condition involving aggregate variables which displays a dependence on λ, the fraction
of rule of thumb households..
Second, the presence of rule-of-thumb households generates a direct eﬀect of em-
ployment on the level of consumption (and, thus, on aggregate demand), beyond the
20eﬀect of the long-term interest rate. This can be seen by "integrating" (31)t oo b t a i n
the following expression in levels:






Thus, for any given path of real interest rates and taxes, an expansion in govern-
ment purchases has the potential to raise aggregate consumption through its induced
expansion in employment and the consequent rise in the real wage, labor income and,
as a result, consumption of rule-of-thumb households. In turn, the resulting increase
in consumption would raise aggregate demand, output and employment even further,
thus triggering a multiplier eﬀect analogous to the one found in traditional Keynesian
models.
Third, the ultimate eﬀect of government purchases on aggregate consumption
depends on the response of taxes (accruing to rule-of-thumb households) and the
expected long term real rate. Those responses will, in turn, be determined by the
￿scal and monetary policy rules in place. Nevertheless, it is clear from the previous
equation that in order for aggregate consumption to increase in response to a rise in
government spending, the response of taxes and interest rates should be suﬃciently
muted. We return to this point below, when analyzing the sensitivity of our results
to alternative calibrations of those policies.
3.6.2 Firms
Log-linearization of (16) and (17) around the zero in￿ation steady state yields the fa-
miliar equation describing the dynamics of in￿ation as a function of the log deviations
of the average markup from its steady state level





θ and, ignoring constant terms,
b ￿
p




t =( yt − kt) − r
k
t (34)
Furthermore, as shown in Woodford (2003), the following "aggregate production
function" holds, up to a ￿rst order approximation:
yt =( 1− α)nt + αkt (35)
3.6.3 Market clearing
Log-linearization of the market clearing condition of the ￿nal good around the steady
state yields:
yt = γc ct + γi it + gt (36)
where γi ≡ I
Y represents the share of investment on output in the steady state.
3.6.4 Fiscal Policy
Linearization of the government budget constraint (19) around a steady state with
zero debt and a balanced primary budget yields
bt+1 =( 1+ρ)( bt + gt − tt)
where ρ ≡ β
−1 − 1 pins down the steady state interest rate. Plugging in the ￿scal
p o l i c yr u l ea s s u m e da b o v ew eo b t a i n :
bt+1 =( 1+ρ)( 1− φb) bt +( 1+ρ)( 1− φg) gt (37)
Hence, under our assumptions, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for non-explosive




224 Analysis of Equilibrium Dynamics
Combining all the equilibrium conditions and doing some straightforward, though
tedious, substitutions we can obtain a system of stochastic diﬀerence equations de-
scribing the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics of the form
A Et{xt+1} = Bx t + εt (38)
where xt ≡ (nt,c t, πt,k t,b t,g t−1)0. The elements of matrices A and B are all
functions of the underlying structural parameters, as shown in Appendix 3. We start
by describing the calibration that we use as a benchmark.
Each period is assumed to correspond to a quarter. We set the discount factor
β equal to 0.99.W ea s s u m eas t e a d ys t a t ep r i c em a r k u p￿p equal to 0.2.T h er a t e
of depreciation δ is set to 0.025. The elasticity of output with respect to capital, α,
is assumed to be 1
3, a value roughly consistent with observed income shares, given
the assumed steady state price markup. All the previous parameter values remain
unchanged in the analysis below. Next we turn to the parameters for which we con-
duct some sensitivity analysis, distinguishing between the non-policy and the policy
parameters.
Our baseline setting for the weight of rule-of-thumb households λ is 1
2.T h i s i s
within the range of estimated values in the literature of the weight of the rule-of-
thumb behavior (see Mankiw (2000)). The fraction of ￿rms that keep their prices
unchanged, θ, is given a baseline value of 0.75, which corresponds to an average price
duration of one year. We set the baseline value for the elasticity of wages with respect
to hours (ϕ)e q u a lt o0.2. This is consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford￿s (1997,
1999) calibration of the elasticity of wages with respect to output of 0.3 combined
with an elasticity of output with respect to hours of 2
3. Finally, we follow King and
Watson (1996), and set η (the elasticity of investment with respect to q)e q u a lt o1.0
in our baseline calibration.
The baseline policy parameters are chosen as follows. We set the size of the
23response of the monetary authority to in￿ation, φπ,t o1.5, a value commonly used in
empirical Taylor rules (and one that satis￿es the so-called Taylor principle). In order
to calibrate the parameters describing the ￿scal policy rule (20) and the government
spending shock (21) (i.e. φg, φb,a n dρg) we use the VAR-based estimates of the
dynamic responses of government spending and de￿cit (see Table 1 for details). In
particular, we set the baseline value of the parameter ρg =0 .9 that matches the
half-life of the responses of government spending. The latter value re￿ects the highly
persistent response of government spending to its own shock. We obtain the values
of the parameter φg from the diﬀerence between the estimated impact responses
of government spending and de￿cit, respectively. As can be seen from Table 1,o u r
(average) estimates suggest a value for that parameter equal to 0.10. Interestingly, the
estimates in Table IV of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) imply a corresponding estimate
of 0.13, very much in line with our estimates and baseline calibration. Finally, and
given ρg and φg, we calibrate parameter φb such that the dynamics of government
spending (21) and debt (37) are consistent with the horizon at which the de￿cit is
back to zero in our estimates. Hence, in our baseline calibration we set φb =0 .33,
in line with the estimated averages for diﬀerent subsamples, as described in Table
1. Finally, we set γg =0 .2, which roughly corresponds to the average share of
government purchases in GDP in postwar U.S. data.
Much of the sensitivity analysis below focuses on the share of rule-of-thumb house-
holds (λ) and its interaction with parameters ρg, θ, η, ϕ and φπ. Given the importance
of the ￿scal rule parameters in the determination of aggregate consumption (and, in-
directly, of other variables) we will also analyze the eﬀect of alternative values for the
policy parameters φb and φg.
244.1 Rule-of-Thumb Consumers, Indeterminacy, and the Tay-
lor Principle
Next we provide a brief analysis of the conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of
equilibrium. A more detailed analysis of those conditions for an economy similar to
the one considered here (albeit without a ￿scal block) can be found in Gal￿, L￿pez-
Salido and VallØs (2004). In that paper we show how the presence of rule-of-thumb
consumers can alter dramatically the equilibrium properties of an otherwise standard
dynamic sticky price model. In particular, under certain parameter con￿gurations
the economy￿s equilibrium may be indeterminate (and thus may display stationary
sunspot ￿uctuations) even when the interest rate rule is one that satis￿es the Taylor
principle (which corresponds to φπ > 1 in our model).
Figure 2 illustrates that phenomenon for the model developed in the previous
section. In particular the ￿gure displays the regions in (λ, θ) space associated with
either a unique equilibrium or indeterminacy, when the remaining parameters are
kept at their baseline values. We see that indeterminacy arises whenever a high
degree of price stickiness coexists with a suﬃciently large weight of rule-of-thumb
households. Both frictions are thus seen to be necessary in order for indeterminacy
to emerge as a property of the equilibrium dynamics. The ￿gure also makes clear that
the equilibrium is unique under our baseline calibration (λ = 1
2, θ =0 .75). We refer
the reader to Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2004) for a discussion of the intuition
underlying that violation of the Taylor principle.26
5T h e E ﬀects of Government Spending Shocks
In the present section we analyze the eﬀects of shocks to government spending in
the model economy described above. In particular, we focus on the conditions un-
der which an exogenous increase in government spending has a positive eﬀect on
26See also Bilbiie (2005) for a subsequent analysis in a model without capital accumulation, and
for a re-assessment of the evolution of Fed policies over the postwar period, in light of that analysis.
25consumption, as found in much of the existing evidence. Throughout we restrict
ourselves to con￿gurations of parameter values for which the equilibrium is unique.
Figure 3 shows the contemporaneous response of output, consumption and in-
vestment (all normalized by steady state output) to a positive government spending
shock, as a function of λ, the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. The size of the
shock is normalized to a one percent of steady state output. Given the above nor-
malizations, the plotted values can be interpreted as impact multipliers. We restrict
the range of λ values considered to those consistent with a unique equilibrium. The
remaining parameters are kept at their baseline values. Figure 3.A corresponds to
the economy with competitive labor markets, Figure 3.B to its imperfectly compet-
itive counterpart. In the former case, consumption declines for most values of λ
considered, except for implausible large ones. The (absolute) size of the decline is,
however, decreasing in λ,r e ￿ecting the oﬀsetting role of rule-of-thumb behavior on
the conventional negative wealth and intertemporal substitution eﬀects triggered by
the ￿scal expansion. When imperfect labor markets are assumed, the possibility of
crowding-in of consumption emerges for values of λ above a threshold value of roughly
1
4, a more plausible value. Notice also that the government spending multiplier on
in￿ation and output rises rapidly when λ increases, attaining values roughly in line
with the empirical evidence reviewed in section 2.
Figure 4 displays the dynamic responses of some key variables in our model to
a positive government spending shock under the baseline calibration, and compares
them to those generated by a neoclassical economy. The latter corresponds to a partic-
ular calibration of our model, with no price rigidities and no rule-of-thumb consumers
(θ = λ =0 ). Again we consider two alternative labor market structures, competitive
and non-competitive. In each case the top-left graph displays the pattern of the three
￿scal variables (spending, taxes and the de￿cit) in response to the shock considered.
Notice that the pattern of both variables is close to the one estimated in the data
(see Figure 1), consistently with our calibration of the ￿scal policy rule. The ￿gures
26illustrates the amplifying eﬀects of the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers and
sticky prices: the response of output and consumption is systematically above that
generated by the neoclassical model.27 Furthermore, in the baseline model, and in
contrast with the neoclassical model, the increase in aggregate hours coexists with an
increase in real wages. Overall we view the model￿s predictions under the assump-
tion of imperfectly competitive labor markets as matching the empirical responses,
at least qualitatively.
Figure 5 shows the government spending (impact) multipliers on output, consump-
tion, and investment, as a function of ρg , the parameter measuring the persistence
of the spending process. In order to avoid excessive dispersion, we henceforth report
￿ndings only for the non-competitive labor market speci￿cation, which the analysis
above pointed to as the most promising one given our objectives. Each of the four
graphs in the Figure corresponds to a diﬀerent parameter con￿guration. The top-left
graph is associated with our baseline calibration. Notice that that in that case the
crowding-in eﬀect on consumption (and the consequent enhancement of the output
multiplier) is decreasing in ρg. The intuition for that result is straightforward: higher
values of that parameter are associated with stronger (negative) wealth eﬀects low-
ering the consumption of Ricardian households. Yet, we see that even for values of
ρg as high as 0.9 a positive (though relatively small) eﬀect on aggregate consumption
emerges. Notice also that the response of investment to the same shock is negative
over the admissible range of ρg. Yet, for values of the latter parameter close to unity
(i.e., near-random walk processes for government spending) that response becomes
negligible.28
The other graphs in Figure 5 report analogous information for three alternative
27That monotonicity contrasts with some of the patterns observed in the data; we conjecture this
is unrelated to the issue at hand and could be ￿xed by the introduction of habit formation and other
mechanisms that generate inertia in aggregate demand.
28As shown below the response of investment depend crucially upon the speci￿cation of capi-
tal adjustment costs. Lower capital adjustment costs tend to increase the (negative) response of
investment (see middle panel of Figure 6).
27"extreme" calibrations. Each calibration assumes a limiting value for one (or two)
parameters, while keeping the rest at their baseline values. Thus, the ﬂexible price
scenario assumes θ =0 ,t h eno rule-of-thumb economy assumes λ =0 ,w h e r e a s
the neoclassical calibration combines both ￿exible prices and lack of rule-of-thumb
consumers (θ = λ =0 ). Notice that when prices are fully ￿exible, or when all
consumers are Ricardian (or when both features coexist, as under the neoclassical
calibration) consumption is always crowded-out in response to a rise in government
spending, independently of the degree of persistence of the latter. This illustrates
the diﬃculty of reconciling the evidence with standard dynamic general equilibrium
models, as well as the role played by both sticky prices and rule-of-thumb consumers
to match that evidence.
The graphs in Figure 6 summarize the sensitivity of the impact multipliers to
variations in three non-policy parameters to the government spending shock. The
￿rst graph explores the sensitivity of the impact multipliers to the degree of price
stickiness, as indexed by parameter θ. Notice that the size of the response of output
is increasing in the degree of price rigidities, largely as a result of a stronger multiplier
eﬀect on consumption. Given baseline values for the remaining parameters, we see
that values of θ slightly higher than 0.5 are consistent with a positive response of
aggregate consumption. That range for θ includes the values generally viewed as
consistent with the micro evidence and, hence, used in most calibrations. The two
middle and bottom graphs show the impact multipliers when the degree of capital
adjustment costs, η, and the wage elasticity parameter, ϕ change. High capital
adjustment costs (i.e., low η) tend to dampen the fall in investment, but enhance
the positive response of consumption and output. Finally, we notice that the impact
multipliers are relatively insensitive to changes in ϕ.
Figure 7 illustrates the sensitivity of the model￿s predictions to the three policy
parameters (φπ,φg, φb), each considered in turn. The top graph shows an inverse
relationship between the size of the impact multipliers and the strength of the central
28bank￿s response to in￿ation (φπ). Intuitively, a large φπ leads to a larger increase in the
real rate in response to the higher in￿ation induced by the ￿scal expansion; as a result
consumption of Ricardian households declines further, dampening the total eﬀect on
aggregate consumption. That ￿nding should not be surprising once we realize that in
staggered price setting models like ours the central bank can approximate arbitrarily
well the ￿exible price equilibrium allocation by following an interest rate rule that
responds with suﬃcient strength to changes in in￿ation. Hence, an increase in φπ
aﬀects the output and consumption multipliers in a way qualitatively similar to an
increase in price ￿exibility (i.e. a decline in θ), as described above.
Finally, the second and third graphs show the sensitivity of the multiplier to
variations in the two parameters of the ￿scal rule. In particular, and of most interest
given our objectives, we see how a positive comovement of consumption and output in
response to government spending shocks requires a suﬃciently high response of taxes
to debt (a high φb), and a suﬃciently low response of taxes to current government
spending (i.e. a low φg). Such a con￿guration of ￿scal parameters will tend to imply a
large but not-too-persistent de￿cit in response to an increase in government spending,
a pattern largely consistent with the empirical evidence described in Section 2.
6 Summary and Assessment of the Model
The analysis above has shown how the interaction between rule-of-thumb behavior
by some households (for which consumption equals labor income) and sticky prices
(modeled as in the recent new Keynesian literature), make it possible to generate an
increase in consumption in response to a persistent expansion in government spending,
in a way consistent with much of the recent evidence. Rule-of-thumb consumers partly
insulate aggregate demand from the negative wealth eﬀects generated by the higher
levels of (current and future) taxes needed to ￿nance the ￿scal expansion, while
making it more sensitive to current disposable income. Sticky prices make it possible
for real wages to increase (or, at least, to decline by a smaller amount) even in the face
29of a drop in the marginal product of labor, as the price markup may adjust suﬃciently
downward to absorb the resulting gap. The combined eﬀect of a higher real wage and
higher employment raises current labor income and hence stimulates the consumption
of rule-of-thumb households. The possible presence of countercyclical wage markups
(as in the version of the model with non-competitive labor markets developed above)
provides additional room for a simultaneous increase in consumption and hours and,
hence, in the marginal rate of substitution, without requiring a proportional increase
in the real wage.
Most importantly, our framework generates a positive comovement of consumption
and government spending under con￿gurations of parameter values that are empir-
ically plausible, and those conventionally assumed in the business cycle literature.
Thus, we view our results as providing a potential solution to the seeming con￿ict
between empirical evidence and the predictions of existing DSGE models regarding
the eﬀects of government spending shocks.
In the present paper we kept both the model and its analysis as simple as possible,
and focused on a single issue. As a result, we left out many possible extensions and
avenues for further exploration. Thus, for instance, our theoretical analysis assumes
that government spending is ￿nanced by means of lump-sum taxes (current or future).
If only distortionary income taxes were available to the government, the response of
the diﬀerent macroeconomic variables to a government spending shock will generally
diﬀer from the one obtained in the economy with lump-sum taxes analyzed above,
and will depend on the composition and timing of the taxation.29
Allowing for staggered nominal wage setting or some form of real wage rigidity
constitutes another potentially useful extension of our framework, one that is likely
to have a signi￿cant eﬀect on the response of real wages and, hence, of labor income
and consumption to any ￿scal shock.
29An example of work in that direction is given by Bilbiie and Straub (2004), who study the
interaction of distortionary taxes and rule of thumb households, albeit in a model without capital
accumulation.
30Another avenue worth pursuing is the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers
in medium-scale DSGE models of the sort developed by Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Those models incorporate many of
the features that have been shown to be useful in accounting for diﬀerent aspects of
economic ￿uctuations, and which have been assumed away in the model developed
above. Such a richer version of our model could be taken to the data, and generate
estimates of the quantitative importance of rule of thumb consumers and their role
in shaping historical economic ￿uctuations.30
A number of papers have documented a stronger interest rate response to changes
in in￿ation during the past two decades, relative to the pre-Volcker era.31 There is
also substantial evidence pointing to a rise in asset market participation over the
postwar period, which in the context of our model could be interpreted as a decline
in the fraction of rule of thumb consumers. The model developed above predicts
a reduction in the government spending multiplier on consumption and output, in
response to both developments. In that spirit, Bilbiie, Meier and Muller (2005)
explore the implications of those changes in the context of a model similar to ours,
and suggest those developments may explain part of the observed decline in ￿scal
multipliers uncovered by Perotti (2004) and others.
Finally, one would want to consider some of the normative implications of our
framework: in a model with the two types of consumers considered above, the mon-
etary and ￿scal policy responses to shocks of diﬀerent nature can be expected to
have distributional eﬀects, which should be taken into account in the design of those
policies. Exploring the implications of the present model for optimal monetary policy
design constitutes an additional interesting avenue for future research.32
30See Coenen and Straub (2004) and Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) for promising early eﬀorts
in that direction.
31See, e.g. Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000).
32This is the road taken by Amato and Laubach (2003), albeit in the context of an alternative
model of rule-of-thumb behavior.
31Appendix 1: Alternative Labor Market Structures
I nt h ep r e s e n tA p p e n d i xw ed e s c r i b et w oa l t e r n a t i v em o d e l so fw a g ed e t e r m i n a t i o n
that generate a log-linear aggregate equilibrium condition corresponding to (30) in
the text.
Perfectly Competitive Labor Markets
When households choose optimally their labor supply taking wages as given the










t + ϕ n
j
t (39)
for j = r,o.
Notice that under our assumption of equality of steady state consumption across
household types, steady state hours will also be equated. Hence we can write
nt = λn
r
t +( 1− λ)n
o
t
which together with (28) and (39) allows us to obtain the aggregate equilibrium
condition
wt ≡ ct + ϕ nt
Wage-setting by Unions
Consider a model with a continuum of unions, each of which represents workers
of a certain type. Eﬀective labor input hired by ￿rm j is a CES function of the









32where †w is the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent types of households. The
fraction of rule-of-thumb and Ricardian consumers is uniformly distributed across
worker types (and hence across unions). Each period, a typical union (say, represent-































Since consumption will generally diﬀer between the two types of consumers, the





t ). Notice that, in writing down the problem above, we have assumed that
the union takes into account the fact that ￿rms allocate labor demand uniformly
across diﬀerent workers of type z, independently of their household type. It follows
that, in the aggregate, we will have Nr
t = No
t = Nt for all t .
The ￿rst order condition of this problem can be written as follows (after invoking




















t ,a n d￿w ≡ †w
†w−1.
Log-linearizing expression (40) and ignoring constant terms yields the wage sched-
ule
wt = χr mrs
r
t + χo mrs
o
t
= e ct + ϕ(χr + χo) nt
where χr ≡ λ W
MRSr ￿w, χo ≡
(1−λ) W
MRSo ￿w,a n de ct ≡ χr cr
t + χo co
t.
Notice that, to the extent that tax policy equates steady state consumption across
household types (i.e. Cr = Co) we will have MRSr = MRSo and, hence, χr = λ and
33χo =1− λ. We can then rewrite the previous equilibrium condition as
wt ≡ ct + ϕ nt
which corresponds to the equation (30) in the text.
Under the present scenario we assume that the wage markup ￿w is suﬃciently large
(and the shocks suﬃciently small) so that the conditions Wt >M R S
j
t for j = r,o
are satis￿ed for all t. Both conditions guarantee that both type of households will be
willing to meet ￿rms￿ labor demand at the prevailing wage.
34A p p e n d i x2 .S t e a d yS t a t eA n a l y s i s
In this short appendix we show that the steady state ratio of aggregate consump-
tion to total output does not depend upon the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers.














=( 1 − γg) −
δα
(ρ + δ)￿p




(implied by the constant marginal cost) and Rk =( ρ+δ) (implied by a constant Q).
Notice that this share of consumption on total output it is independent of the share
of rule-of-thumb consumers and our assumption on the labor market structure.
35Appendix 3. Derivation of the Reduced Dynamical System
The equilibrium conditions describing the model dynamics are given by expres-
sions (30)-(37). Now we reduce those conditions to the ￿ve variable system (38) in
terms of hours, consumption, in￿ation, capital and government spending.
The ￿rst equation in the system (38) corresponds to the linearized capital accu-
mulation equation (25), with it substituted out using market clearing condition (36)
and replacing yt subsequently using the production function (35):
kt+1 =
￿
1 − δ +
δα




1 − e γc
nt −
δγ c
1 − e γc
ct −
δ
1 − e γc
gt (41)
where e γc = γc+γg.I no r d e rt od e r i v et h es e c o n de q u a t i o ni n( 3 8 )w es t a r tb yr e w r i t i n g
the in￿ation equation (32) in terms of variables contained in xt. Using (33) and (30)
we obtain an expression for the marginal cost as a function of the consumption output
ratio and aggregate hours
￿t = yt − ct − (1 + ϕ) nt (42)
Substituting the previous expression (42) into (32), and making use of (35) yields
t h es e c o n de q u a t i o ni n( 3 8 )
πt = β Et{πt+1} + λp [ct − yt +( 1+ϕ) nt]
= β Et{πt+1} + λp ct − αλp kt +( α + ϕ)λp nt (43)
Aggregate Euler Equation: the Case of Perfectly Competitive Labor
Markets As noticed above, under the assumption of perfectly competitive labor
markets, we can log-linearize expressions (8), (12), and combine them with (28) and
(29) to yield expression (30). From log-linearizing expression (12) we obtain an




−1 (wt − c
r
t)
We now substitute the previous expression as well as (30) into expression (27).
After rearranging terms this yields cr
t as a function only of aggregate variables,
[￿
pγcϕ +( 1− α)] c
r




As before noticed, we also apply the operator (1−L−1) to expression (28), which
yields









Finally, we substitute expressions (44) and (26) into the previous one, which after
rearranging terms, yields the Euler equation for aggregate consumption presented in
the main text
ct = Et{ct+1} −
1
e σ




e σ ≡ (1 − λ)Γ [￿pϕγc +( 1− α)], Θn ≡ λΓ(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)ϕ, Θt ≡ λΓ￿pϕ,a n d
Γ ≡ 1
γc￿pϕ+(1−α)(1−λ(1+ϕ)).
Aggregate Euler Equation: the Case of Imperfectly Competitive Labor



































γc ￿p [ct − Et{ct+1}]+
(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)








37We also apply the operator (1 − L−1) to expression (28), which yields









Finally, we substitute expressions (45) and (26) into the previous one, which after
rearranging terms yields an Euler-like equation for aggregate consumption:
ct = Et{ct+1} −
γc ￿p(1 − λ)
γc ￿p − λ (1 − α)
(rt − Et{πt+1})
−
λ (1 + ϕ)( 1− α)









ct = Et{ct+1} −
1
e σ




e σ ≡ γcΦ(1 − λ)￿p, Θn ≡ λΦ(1 − α)(1 + ϕ), Θt ≡ λΦ￿p,a n dΦ ≡ 1
γc￿p−λ(1−α),
which are the coeﬃcients of this expression in the text.
Plugging into the Euler equation the interest rate rule (18), the ￿scal rule (20),
and using the fact the government spending follows a ￿rst order autoregressive process
(21) we obtain the third equation in (38):
ct − Θn nt +
φπ
e σ
πt = Et{ct+1} +
1
e σ
Et{πt+1} − Θn Et{nt+1} (46)
+Θtφb ∆bt+1 + Θtφg(ρg − 1) gt
In order to derive the fourth equation we ￿rst combine (42) and (34) to obtain
rk
t = ct − kt +( 1+ϕ)nt.T h el a t t e re x p r e s s i o na n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l e( 18), allows
us to rewrite the equations describing the dynamics of Tobin￿s q and investment as
follows:
it − kt = β Et{(it+1 − kt+1)}
+η[1 − β(1 − δ)] [Et{ct+1} − kt+1 +( 1+ϕ) Et{nt+1}]
−ηφπ πt + η Et{πt+1}
38Finally, substituting the relationship
it − kt =
￿
1
1 − e γc
¶
[(1 − α)nt − γcct − gt − (1 − e γc − α)kt]
(which can be derived by combining the goods market clearing condition with the
production function) into the previous equation and rearranging terms we obtain the
fourth equation of our dynamical system
(1 − α) nt − γc ct − (1 − e γc − α) kt +( 1− e γc)ηφπ πt =[ ω(1 + ϕ)+β(1 − α)] Et{nt+1}
+(ω − βγc) Et{ct+1}
−[ω + β(1 − e γc − α)] kt+1
+(1 − e γc)η Et{πt+1} (47)
+(1 − βρg) gt
where ω ≡ η[1 − β(1 − δ)](1 − e γc) > 0.
The last two equations of the system correspond to expression (37) describing the
debt accumulation and the autoregressive process for government spending (21).
Hence the system of equations (41), (43), (46), (47), (37), and (21) can be written
in a matrix form as follows
A Et{xt+1} = Bx t + εt








00 0 1 0 δ
1−e γc
00 β 00 0
−Θn 1 1
e σ 0 Θtφb Θt(ρg − 1)φg
ω(1 + ϕ)+β(1 − α) ω − βγc (1 − e γc)η −[ω + β(1 − e γc − α)] 0 (1 − βρg)
00 0 0 1 −(1 + ρ)(1 − φg)



















1−e γc 01 − δ + δα
1−e γc 00
−(α + ϕ)λp −λp 1 αλp 00
−Θn 1
φπ
e σ 0 Θtφb 0
1 − α −γc (1 − e γc)ηφπ e γc + α − 100
000 0 ( 1 + ρ)(1 − φb)0
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44Table 1. Estimated Eﬀects of Government Spending Shocks
Estimated Fiscal Multipliers Implied
Output Consumption Fiscal Parameters
1stQ 4thQ 8thQ 1stQ 4thQ 8thQ ρg φg φb
1948:I-2003:IV
Baseline Spending
Small VAR 0.51 0.31 0.28 0.04 0.09 0.190 . 8 50 . 100 . 10
Larger VAR 0.41 0.31 0.68 0.07 0.11 0.49 0.80 0.06 0.06
Excluding Military
Small VAR 0.15- 0 . 120 . 3 4- 0 . 11 0.24 0.32 0.95 0.005 0.60
Larger VAR 0.36 0.62 1.53 0.03 0.51 0.68 0.94 0.005 0.60
1954:I-2003:IV
Baseline Spending
Small VAR 0.74 0.75 1.22 0.14 0.46 0.73 0.95 0.130 . 2 0
Larger VAR 0.68 0.70 1.74 0.17 0.29 0.95 0.95 0.100 . 3 0
Excluding Military
Small VAR 0.63 1.95 2.60 0.25 1.411 .12 0.95 0.05 0.50
Larger VAR 0.74 2.37 3.50 0.37 1.39 1.76 0.95 0.01 0.50
1960:I-2003:IV
Baseline Spending
Small VAR 0.911 .05 1.32 0.19 0.59 0.84 0.95 0.130 . 2 0
Larger VAR 0.81 0.44 0.76 0.20 0.25 0.45 0.95 0.08 0.20
Excluding Military
Small VAR 0.72 1.14 1.190 . 17 0.78 0.68 0.94 0.03 0.50
Larger VAR 1.13 1.89 2.08 0.40 1.14 1.07 0.98 0.01 0.55
Note: The "large" VAR corresponds to the 8-variable VAR described in the text; the
"small" VAR estimates are based on a 4-variable VAR including government spending, out-
put, consumption, and the de￿cit. Government spending excluding military was obtained
as GFNEH+GSEH+GFNIH+GSIH. For each speci￿cation ρg is the AR(1)c o e ﬃcient that
matches the half-life of the estimated government spending response. Parameter φg is ob-
tained as the diﬀerence of the VAR-estimated impact eﬀects of government spending and
de￿cit, respectively. Finally, given ρg and φg, we calibrate the parameter φb such that
the dynamics of government spending (21) and debt (37) are consistent with the horizon
at which the de￿cit is back to steady state, matching our empirical VAR responses of the
￿scal de￿cit.
45Figure 1 
The Dynamic Effects of a Government Spending Shock 
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Note: Estimated impulse responses to a government spending shock in the large VAR. Sample Period 1954:I-2003:IV. The horizontal axis represents quarters 
after the shock.  Confidence intervals correspond +/- 1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on 1000 Monte Carlo replications. The right 










Note: Based on the model with competitive labor markets, remaining 











Figure 3. Impact Multipliers: Sensitivity to λ 
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Note: Baseline calibration for remaining parameters.  
 
 
 Figure 4. The Dynamic Effects of a Government Spending Shock: 
Baseline vs. Neoclassical Models 
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B. Non-Competitive Labor Market 
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Figure 5. Impact Multipliers: Sensitivity to ρg 
Alternative Calibrations 
(Non Competitive Labor Market) 
 









































Figure 6. Impact Multipliers: 









































Figure 7. Impact Multipliers: 
 Sensitivity to Policy Parameters (φπ, φg, φb) 
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